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Abstract
We test six hypotheses for contributions in dilemma games, a category that includes the prisoner's
dilemma and public goods games. The hypotheses we consider are taken from a wide range of
models, and each can explain some aspect of contributing behavior observed in previous studies.
Our experiment focuses specifically on the strategic interdependence of contributing behavior, and
manipulates the strategy space of a two-person dilemma game especially designed for the task. The
hypothesis that contributors have non-linear preferences over own and the other player’s payoffs
accurately matches the strategic pattern of contributing that we observe across treatments.  None of
the reasons for contributing advanced by the other hypotheses, whether alone or in additive
combination, does so.
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1.  Introduction: Explaining the strategy sensitivity of contributions
While some people free ride on the public good, others contribute to it, and do so in
amounts that are meaningful.  People contribute time and money enough to sustain charities, and
vote often enough to sustain democracy.  Economists studying public goods games in the laboratory
observe much the same: A significant number of people contribute to the public good, even as
others free ride.
 The standard conceptual vehicles for studying these issues are dilemma games, a class of
stylized strategic encounters that encompasses the prisoner's dilemma, public goods and common
pool resource games, among others.  All dilemma games share two defining characteristics.  First,
if players are rational and self-interested, then free riding is a dominant strategy, producing the
highest possible individual payoff regardless of what others do.  Second, deviation from the
dominant strategy leads to a higher joint payoff for the group, and enough contributions produce an
outcome Pareto superior to the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.
Rational self-interest provides a clear and convincing explanation for free riding.  But how
do we explain the contributing?  One can seek an explanation on two different levels.  On one
level, one can ask whether contributions are, perhaps in some disguised way, consistent with
standard notions of individual self-interest.  Alternatively, we can accept the propensity to
contribute as fact, and then ask 'What characterization of contributing behavior suffices for the
purpose of accurately predicting dilemma game outcomes?'  The latter approach has a long
tradition in economics (ex., Hochman and Rodgers, 1969; Becker, 1974), and it is the approach
addressed by the experiment we describe here.
The right way to characterize contributing behavior is a matter of some controversy, with
many competing hypotheses.  Dawes and Thaler (1988) organize their survey around two core
concepts.  Altruism posits that contributions are an expression of concern for the payoff of other
people.  Norms of cooperation posits that people play by rules that are inconsistent with standard
assumptions about strategic thinking.   Ledyard (1995), in a review of public goods experiments,
adds a third category, mistakes: "[S]ubjects make mistakes, do not care, are bored, and choose
their allocations randomly," p. 170.
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Each of these categories – altruism, norms of cooperation and mistakes – encompasses a
number of specific hypotheses. It is not practical to consider all of them at the same time.  Instead,
we focus on two prominent hypotheses from each category.  Each hypothesis we consider is
derived from a model of contributing behavior found in the literature, and each can explain some
aspect of contributing behavior identified in empirical studies.  We add that our experiment is very
simple, and the reader should find it straightforward to take any omitted explanation to the data.3
Our experiment compares hypotheses on the basis of strategy sensitivity, the extent to
which a player's contribution depends on beliefs about others' contributions.  Ledyard's statement
of the mistakes hypothesis, for example, is strategy insensitive.  For each hypothesis-category, we
examine one hypothesis that is strategy sensitive and one that is not.  The strategy sensitive
hypotheses differ on how contributions are predicted to shift with information about others'
contributions.
The experimental treatments manipulate the strategy space of a simple two-person dilemma
game, with the consequence of changing the information available to a player about the other
player’s contribution.  It is conceivable that reasons for contributing change as the number of
players increases.  We return to comment on this issue later; for now we note that the experiment’s
design can, in principle, be extended to games of more than two persons.  Hence the present two-
player study provides a baseline for studying this issue further.4
We emphasize that our experiment does not rule out any given hypothesis as the explanation
for some individual behavior.  What we do find is that only one of the hypotheses correctly tracks
the pattern of shifts and non-shifts in overall contributing that we observe across treatments.  None
of the other hypotheses, whether considered alone or in additive combination, does so.  The
significance of this result has to do with strategic model construction.  In particular, the result is
important information about what a model must do to track some basic features of what we will
see to be a strong strategic interdependence in player contributions.5
                                                
3 Including the additional hypotheses that we are aware of would not change our conclusions.
4 Isaac and Walker (1988) provide experimental evidence that contributing behavior in public goods games may be
sensitive to the number of players.
5Studies such as Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram (1996) ask ‘What kinds of behavior are there and what is the
proportion of each in the population?’ whereas we are interested in the relative predictive power of the various
kinds of behavior.  The two lines of research are complementary.
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2.  Hypotheses from a range of models
We describe the hypotheses in the context of the domain to be investigated.  Our experiment
concerns the 2-player payoff matrix displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1.  Dilemma Game Payoff Matrix (payoffs in Spanish pesetas)
                                                Options available to A
1 2 3 4 5 6
Options
available
2
A gets 1750
B gets  500
A gets  1700
B gets  700
A gets  1650
B gets  900
A gets  1600
B gets  1100
A gets  1550
B gets  1300
A gets  1500
B gets  1500
to B
1
A gets  750
B gets  750
A gets  700
B gets  950
A gets  650
B gets  1150
A gets  600
B gets  1350
A gets  550
B gets  1550
A gets  500
B gets  1750
The matrix reflects a particular linear public goods payoff function: Player A chooses between six
levels of contribution, gA = 1,...,6.  For each contribution level above 1, A incurs a marginal cost of
50 pesetas and B realizes a marginal benefit of 200 pesetas.  Player B chooses between two levels
of contribution, gB = 1 or 2.  Contributing 2 costs B 250 pesetas, and benefits A 1000 pesetas.   In
our experiment, the payoff matrix is always common knowledge to the players.  The standard
dominant strategy argument implies that each player contributes the minimum, 1, independent of
what either player knows of the other's choice.  (The dominant strategy argument is therefore
strategy insensitive.)
By design, the primary focus of the analysis is on A’s choice.  To make the game as
cognitively simple for A as possible, we restrict B to two choices: B either contributes or he
doesn't, there are no subtle shades.  On the other hand, giving A six choices, rather than say two,
provides a detailed portrait of A's motivations.6
                                                
6To see the point, suppose we restricted A to just two of his choices, say 1 and 6.  Suppose further that A knows
that B chooses 2, and that under this condition we observe all A's playing 1.  We might be tempted to take this as
evidence for pure self-interest, but in fact it only shows that A is not so concerned with B’s payoffs as to give up
1250 for B.  We cannot rule out that, had A been given the opportunity to play 3, he would have given the more
modest gift of 100.
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Dominant strategy equilibrium does not admit contributing behavior.  On the other hand, it
is a simple, well-defined argument, and one that we find provides a useful organizing framework
for posing the hypotheses we want to test.  We express the dominant strategy argument in terms of
three components:
     C1.  Player A prefers a higher value of his payoff, xA, to a lower value.
     C2.  Player A can identify the action that best satisfies C1.
     C3.  Player A takes the action that he believes best satisfies C1.
The dominant strategy argument is assembled as follows: Player A sees that gA = 1 maximizes the
amount of money he will make no matter what the other player does (C1 and C2).  He chooses gA =
1 (C3).
Each component, C1 through C3, represents a well-defined conceptual building block:
payoff preferences (C1), cognition (C2) and choice (C3).  Roughly speaking, each hypothesis we
test varies one component while holding the other two fixed.  Altruistic hypotheses modify C1,
cooperative norms modify C3, and mistakes modify C2.
We now lay out the hypotheses using the payoff matrix in Figure 1 to clarify some of the
ideas.  For each category (altruism, norms of cooperation, mistakes) there are two hypotheses; one
that is strategy sensitive and one that is not.
2.1  Altruism Hypotheses:  Alternatives to C1
Altruism posits that people have preferences over the other player’s payoff as well as their
own.  Hence the two altruism hypotheses reformulate payoff preferences.
Linear altruism (C1.a).  Contributing player A has preferences over the commodity bundle
given by u( xA, xB )=  xA+axB, where a > 0 is the coefficient of altruism.
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This straightforward way of modeling altruism has a long tradition in economics, going
back to Edgeworth (1881).  It was recently used by Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) as part of
the explanation for linear and quadratic public goods games with more than two players.7
In a public goods environment like ours linear altruism makes an all or nothing prediction:
Player A will contribute either 1 or 6.  The next hypothesis allows for intermediate behavior.
Distributive preferences (C1.b): Contributing player A has non-linear preferences over (xA, xB)
such that A’s contribution will be larger when B chooses 2 than when B chooses 1.
Several specific models imply the distributive preferences hypothesis. For one, there is Becker’s
(1974) seminal analysis of the public goods problem. One can formulate A’s decision problem as
choosing a bundle (xA, xB) subject to xA+1/4xB= wA+1/4wB. The right hand side of this equation is
what Becker calls social income. We now conceive of the payoffs in column 1 as the amount of
available social income, which is larger in row 2 than in row 1.  Assuming that both arguments in
the utility function represent normal goods (something we can test the data for), then as the
available social income rises, so does A’s choice of both xA and xB.
Another model that implies the distributive preferences hypothesis is the ERC model of
Bolton and Ockenfels (1997).  This model can explain a variety of phenomena associated with
laboratory games.  In this model, utility functions are of the form u(xA, xA/(xA+xB)).  The first
argument is known as the absolute payoff, and the second argument is known as the relative payoff.
Utility is non-decreasing in the absolute payoff (holding the relative payoff fixed), and strictly
decreasing as one moves away from a relative payoff of ½ (holding the absolute payoff fixed).
Therefore A will want to contribute 1 if he knows B will contribute 1, since this contribution is
best for both A’s absolute and relative payoff.   A will contribute more than 1 only if B contributes
                                                
7 This model mixes linear altruism with the mistakes explanation.  While we begin by checking the explanatory
power of linear altruism and mistakes separately, later on we consider their joint explanatory power.  Another
hypothesis that falls into the altruism category is joint payoff maximization. Andreoni and Miller (1996), for
example, present evidence that some players are joint payoff maximizers.  While we do not explicitly consider this
hypothesis in the text, the reader will be able to verify that it cannot explain the shifts in contributions we observe
in our experiment.
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2.  Note that the prediction that A chooses the minimum contribution when he knows B does so is
more restrictive than what Becker’s models predicts.  We return to this point in the summary
section.
Both altruism hypotheses retain C2 and C3.  So given linear altruism (C1.a), playing 6, or
playing 1, depending on the coefficient of altruism a, is the best strategy for A independent of B's
choice.  By C2, A recognizes this point, and so by C3, A plays 6 (or 1). Linear altruism is strategy
insensitive because the predicted contribution is independent of A's expectation of what B will do.
Distributive preferences, on the other hand, is strategy sensitive because A's contribution depends
critically on B's contribution. The experiment allows us to check on this implication.
2.2  Norms of Cooperation: Alternatives to C3
Norms of cooperation assert that people sometimes forgo their own immediate self-interest
out of a sense of obligation to conform to particular rules.  Hence both norms of cooperation
hypotheses reformulate C3.  One hypothesis asserts that the right action is independent of what the
other player might do (so it is strategy insensitive).  The other asserts that the right action depends
critically on the action of the other player (so it is strategy sensitive).8
Unconditional Cooperation (C3.a).  Player A feels obligated to contribute more than the
minimum independent of what he expects B to contribute.
Direct Reciprocity (C3.b).  Player A feels obligated to contribute more than the minimum
only if he expects player B to contribute more than the minimum.9
The key difference between altruism and norms of cooperation is that altruism emphasizes concern
for the game outcome, whereas norms emphasize a concern for performing the correct act.
                                                
8Dawes and Thaler sketch a version of norms of cooperation motivated by altruism.  We follow Sugden (1984)
because his development offers a sharper alternative to the altruism hypotheses.  The reader might wonder how it
is possible to achieve self-interested goals by following rules that benefit others.  Here is an example: Some
religious rules concerning behavior towards others are associated with individual rewards (punishment) for
conformity (violation).
9 The term reciprocity has been used in a variety of different ways, often in connection to multi-period
environments. We use the adjective ‘direct’ to clarify that we refer to a specific definition.
- 7 -
Unconditional cooperation is what Sugden (1984) refers to as 'Kantian' behavior, indicating its
philosophical roots.  Contributions are conceived as obligations, and as such they are willfully
independent of strategic considerations.  Distinct from the linear altruism hypothesis, the
unconditional cooperation hypothesis allows for a contribution level other than 1 or 6.
Direct reciprocity is essentially a simplified version of Sugden's (1984) 'principle of
reciprocity.'  Player A feels an obligation to contribute only if B also contributes.  Likewise,
Rabin’s (1993) model of fairness equilibrium suggests that A will contribute only if B does
something for A (contributes 2).  Sugden (1984) demonstrates that his model is consistent with a
set of stylized facts having to do with charitable giving.  Rabin (1993) demonstrates that his model
is consistent with stylized facts having to do with two-person normal form games.  Making
contributing conditional on B’s volition distinguishes direct reciprocity from distributive
preferences.  A's contribution is a payback for B trusting A as opposed to a reflection of A's
preferences over the payoff allocation.  Our experiment exploits this distinction.
2.3  Mistakes: Alternatives to C2
Mistakes hypotheses imply that players cooperate out of confusion or error – a
modification of C2.  One hypothesis asserts that mistakes are random, while the other asserts they
are systematic.
Random Errors (C2.a).  Contributing players A chooses a contribution randomly drawn
from some probability distribution.
This is Ledyard's proposition that "[S]ubjects make mistakes...and choose their allocations
randomly." 10  Random errors play a role in several models of public goods experiments, often in
combination with some form of altruism (ex., Anderson et al., 1998, and Palfrey and Prisbrey,
1997).
                                                
10We drop the part of Ledyard's statement asserting that subjects "do not care, are bored."  The dropped part
concerns payoff salience, and implies a modification of C1.  Because Ledyard is so specific about the implication
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Misidentification (C2.b).  Contributing players A confuse the game with one that is more
common to their everyday experience.  Failing to recognize the dominant strategy, they
contribute the fixed amount, gA > 1, specified by the social norm they associate with the
everyday game.
Misidentification is a specific interpretation of Gale, Binmore and Samuelson's (1995) argument,
that they advance in the context of the ultimatum bargaining game,
Short-term behavior in the Ultimatum Game is likely to be governed by social norms that are triggered by the
framing of the laboratory experiment.  Rather than being adapted to the Ultimatum Game, such social norms
will presumably have evolved for use in everyday cousins of the Ultimatum Game. (p. 72)
Admittedly, we could interpret Gale et al.'s conjecture as implying that the social norm is played
intentionally (not a mistake), but this would lead us to the norms of cooperation hypotheses already
considered.  Misidentification differs from random errors in two ways.  First, it postulates a
systematic pattern of contribution that random errors does not.  Second, misidentification may be
strategy sensitive (we elaborate on this below).
Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses we test by key concept and strategy sensitivity.
Table 1.  Classification of the Six Hypotheses
strategy
sensitive
strategy
insensitive
altruism distributive
preferences
linear
altruism
norms of
cooperation
direct
reciprocity
unconditional
cooperation
mistakes misidentification random errors
                                                                                                                                                            
of his argument – subjects choose randomly – the C2 formulation is sufficient to capture the empirical content of
the argument.
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3.  The Separation Experiment
The three treatments of the experiment vary the strategy space with the important
consequence of varying what A knows about B's choice of contribution.  In this way, the
experiment provides a test of the sensitivity of player contributions to other player’s contributions.
In one treatment, B's choice is unknown, in the second B's choice is known, and in the third B has
but one choice.  We first detail the game in each treatment, and then describe what the hypotheses
predict.
The game in the uninformed treatment is a standard simultaneous move dilemma game:
Player A chooses among contributions 1 through 6, unconditionally and without knowing B's
choice.  Likewise, B chooses between 1 and 2, unconditionally and without knowing A's choice.
Payoffs are as in the Figure 1 matrix.
The game in the informed treatment differs from that in the uninformed treatment in but one
way: player A chooses contingent on B's choice. That is, A makes two choices, one for each of B's
potential choices.  B chooses unconditionally, without knowing A's choice.  The informed game is
strategically equivalent to having B choose first, and A choose after being informed of B's choice.
We use the strategy method; that is, we ask A to say what he will choose in both contingencies.
This method provides a more complete portrait of A's behavior.11
Games in the dictator treatment are played precisely as in the uninformed treatment,
except both rows of the payoff matrix are identical to the top row in Figure 1; hence B's choice
does not matter, making A a 'dictator.'  The dictator game shares two important features with
dilemma games.  First, A's dominant strategy is to contribute the minimum possible, 1.  Second,
deviations from the dominant strategy increase joint payoffs.  The attraction of the dictator game
for our purposes is that it is in fact not really a game; it is a one-person decision task.  So the
                                                
11Although standard theory says that the procedures should be equivalent, asking a subject for a conditional choice
as opposed to asking after he sees his partner's move may produce differences in results. Schotter, Weigelt and
Wilson (1994) provide some evidence on this issue.  Brandts and Charness (1998) investigate this issue in
experiments with simple sequential games very similar to ours. Their results show no differences between the two
elicitation procedures.  As shown below, the treatment effects we find are all very large; when there is no effect,
this too is unambiguous.  It turns out that our results are rather stark and a modest elicitation effect would probably
not substantially alter the conclusions we draw.
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dictator's choice is free of strategic confounding, and this allows a clear gauge of payoff
preferences.  The dictator game has been the object of numerous studies (see for example, Forsythe
et al., 1994).
Steady framing across treatments is crucial to testing several of the hypotheses we
consider.  The protocol for the experiment, a complete description of verbal and written
instructions provided to subjects, appears in Appendix A.  A synopsis is given in section 3.2.  For
the moment, note that the protocols for the uninformed and dictator treatments are identical save for
the necessary difference in the bottom row payoffs in the Figure 1 matrix.  The informed treatment
differs from the uninformed only in the addition of a few words to explain the conditional choice
of A.
Subjects play the game once in each player role with no feedback in between games (a
detailed description of this design follows in section 3.2). Game repetition was introduced to
public goods studies to see if contributions would diminish as players learn about the game and the
behavior of other players (Ledyard, 1995, section D).  The underlying conjecture is that some
contributions are due to confusion about the game or mistaken expectations about the behavior of
others.  Our experiment allows us to check on these explanations without introducing repetition.
Specifically, testing the mistakes hypotheses directly checks on confusion about the game.  And we
can check on people’s expectations about the behavior of others by comparing Player A
contributions in the uninformed game to those in the other games where A conditions his
contribution on B’s.12
3.1  Testing the Hypotheses
It is convenient to think of the informed treatment as being composed of two halves, one for
A's choice when B-chooses-bottom (chooses 1, the minimum contribution), and one for A's choice
                                                
12We add that repetition introduces interesting but complicated additional issues, such as strategic reputation
building and how people learn.  The knowledge gained here concerning why people contribute in the one-time case
should be useful to the study of the case with repetition.
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when B-chooses-top (chooses 2).  So while there are just three treatments, the experiment has four
distinct 'cells.'
Table 2.  Predictions about Player A's contribution
  Hypothesis   Predictions
   linear altruism   
A
Ug  = 
A
Ig 1  = 
A
Ig 2  = 
A
Dg   =  1 or 6
   distributive preferences   
A
Ig 2  = 
A
Dg  > 
A
Ug  ³ 
A
Ig 1
   unconditional cooperation   
A
Ug  = 
A
Ig 1  = 
A
Ig 2  = 
A
Dg
   direct reciprocity   
A
Ig 2  > 
A
Ug  ³ 
A
Ig 1  = 
A
Dg
   random errors   
A
Ug  = 
A
Ig 1  = 
A
Ig 2  = 
A
Dg  (expected value)
   misidentification   
A
Ug  =
A
Dg ;  
A
Ig 1  = 
A
Ig 2
U = uninformed; I1 = informed, B-chooses-bottom row; I2 = informed, B-chooses-top row; D = dictator.
Each hypothesis makes a prediction about the pattern of A’s contributions as the
information about B’s contribution changes.  In terms of the experiment, each hypothesis makes a
prediction about how contributions will shift (or not shift) across cells.  Before going on to the
explanation the reader should take a moment to examine the summary of predictions about shifts in
contributions displayed in Table 2.
We begin with the three hypotheses that are strategy insensitive.  All predict that A's
contribution will be independent of his expectation of B's contribution.  The linear altruism
hypothesis predicts gA = 1 or 6 for all cases.  The unconditional cooperation hypothesis does not
specify a particular contribution level since subjects may differ with respect to their sense of
obligation.  The random errors hypothesis predicts A’s contribution will be drawn from the same
distribution, d(gA), across cells; hence, in terms of expected value, the contribution is predicted to
be the same in all cells.
Application of the unconditional cooperation hypothesis to the dictator game is open to the
objection that the distinct payoff matrix for the dictator game may call up a different
(unconditional) norm of behavior than the other games.  If we accept this argument, we can confine
- 12 -
our comparison to the two informed cells – surely a fair test of the unconditionality.  Likewise, one
might argue that framing is important to the (otherwise) random errors we see.  But the protocol for
uninformed and dictator treatments was identical save for the changes in payoff numbers
(Appendix A).  The two informed cells necessarily had identical instructions.  So again, if we
wish, we can confine ourselves to these comparisons.  (We will not consider these variations
further in the text, but the reader can verify that they are contradicted by the data.)
Each of the three remaining hypotheses is strategy sensitive and each predicts a distinct
pattern of contribution shifts across cells.
Distributive preferences implies that contributions in the dictator cell should be identical to
those in the B-chooses-top cell, since in both cases A chooses from precisely the same set of
allocations.  We explained in section 2.1 why there should be more contributions in the B-chooses-
top cell than in the B-chooses-bottom cell.  For the uninformed cell, A cannot (plausibly) be certain
about what action B will take.  A should never contribute more than he would in the B-chooses-top
cell, since this is the most he would give no matter what B contributes.  By the same reasoning, A
should never contribute less than he would in the B-chooses-bottom cell.  If A contributors are risk
averse, which is the usual assumption, then contributions should be strictly lower in the
uninformed cell than in the B-chooses-top cell – a risk averse A contributor will respond to the
uncertainty about B's contribution by giving less than he would if he were certain that B would
contribute.  If the assessment of the probability that B will contribute is low enough, then
contributions in the uninformed cell may be as low as in the B-chooses-bottom cell.
Direct reciprocity makes two predictions that differ sharply with distributive preferences:
First, direct reciprocity implies that A contributes strictly more in the B-chooses-top cell than in
the dictator cell, where he contributes the minimum.  The reason is that direct reciprocity posits
that A feels an obligation to contribute more than the minimum only if B chooses to do so, and B
has a choice in the informed game, but no meaningful decision in the dictator game.  Second,
because there is nothing for A to reward in the B-chooses-bottom cell, A contributions should be
the same minimum amount as in the dictator cell.  A third prediction concerning the uninformed
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cell is similar to that for distributive preferences: Since A is uncertain about B's contribution in the
uninformed cell, we expect that A contributions in the uninformed cell to be less than in the B-
chooses-top cell, and no less than in B-chooses-bottom.
The misidentification hypothesis predicts the same contribution in the dictator cell as in the
uninformed cell because the protocols are the same save for the payoff matrix; hence whatever
confusion that is engendered by the frame should be the same across the two cells, and so both
games should evoke the same social norm and contribution.  (One might argue that contributions
should be less in the dictator cell since the game is in a mild sense simpler – the fact that the two
rows of numbers in the payoff matrix are identical in the dictator cell means that the game requires
less strategic analysis.  So the weaker prediction is that contributions in the dictator cell will be
less than or equal to those in the uninformed cell.  We leave it to the reader to verify that this
variation is contradicted by the data.)  The frame for the two informed cells is identical, so these
two cells should also evoke the same contribution.
3.2  Sample Sizes, Subject Pool, and Procedures
Each treatment was comprised of two sessions.  Each session involved from 14 to 18
subjects (always an even number).  There were a total of 32 subjects in the uninformed treatment,
34 in each of the other treatments.  All sessions were run at the Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona.  Subjects were recruited from undergraduate classes.  Participation required appearing
at a special place and time, and was restricted to one session.  The chance to earn cash was the
only incentive offered.
All subjects were seated so that they could not observe others’ choices.  The lab protocol
(Appendix A) includes all verbal and written communication between monitor and subjects save
for individual subject questions-and-answers.  The same experimenter was the communicating
monitor for all sessions (others silently managed the paper flow).  Instructions were read aloud.
The payoff matrix, shown in Figure 1, was displayed on a blackboard, and each cell was
explained.  Subjects played two games without knowing which one would be chosen for payment.
A and B roles were alternated between games.  Matching was anonymous and randomly selected
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for each game.  After both games were played, a coin flip chose one game for payoff.  To preserve
anonymity, those with the B role for the chosen game were taken to another room and paid
separately.  Subjects received no fee beyond the earnings for the game.  Average subject earnings
were 1134 pesetas, equivalent to about $8.72 at the exchange rate that prevailed at the time of the
experiment.13
The experiment had a "no feedback" design: subjects were not informed of the outcome of
the first game prior to playing the second.  This arrangement has two advantageous features.  First,
order and learning effects are not an issue; in this sense each game is 'single play.'  Second, roles
are rotated between games, allowing us to gather player A data from each subject.  An important
point about both of these features is that they are held constant across treatments, and so they
cannot explain the shifts in contributions we observe.
In the context of our game, the double blind hypothesis, a methodological hypothesis not
considered above, attributes subject contributions to experimenter observation.  Laury, Walker and
Williams (1995) performed a direct test of double blind in a public goods game, and found no
supporting evidence.  Most importantly, all treatments were run without a double blind procedure,
so the double blind explanation cannot explain the shifts in contributions we observe.
                                                
13 Each session lasted about 45 minutes.
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4.  Results from the New Experiment
The complete data set appears in Appendix B.  Figure 2 displays player A contributions by
cell.
Figure 2.  Player A Contributions†
0
5
10
15
20
25
Public Goods
0
5
10
15
20
25
Dictator
0
5
10
15
20
25
Public Goods
Informed
B chooses top row
0
5
10
15
20
25
Public Goods
Informed
 B chooses bottom row
Uninformed
n = 33 n = 33
n=32 n=34
    1       2        3       4        5        6
    1       2        3       4        5       6
    1       2        3       4        5       6     1       2        3        4        5       6
contribution contribution
contribution contribution
frequency frequency
frequency
†There are 33, instead of 34, observations for the informed treatment because we eliminated one subject who did not indicate
a choice when B does not contribute.
Contributions are higher for the dictator cell and the B-chooses-top cell; lower in the other two.
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Table 3 summarizes the results of a statistical comparison of the distributions.
Table 3.  Statistical Comparison of the Four Cells
t-test: difference in average contribution level
g- A = sample mean
g-  A(col) - g-  A(row)
(one tail p-value) Uninformed Dictator
Informed:
B-chooses-top
Dictator -2.48
(< 0.0001)
Informed:
B-chooses-top row
-1.89
(0.0003)
0.59
(0.6357)
Informed:
B-chooses-bottom row
0.26
(0.2557)
2.74
(< 0.0001)
2.15
(< 0.0001)
Empirical c2-test: homogeneity of distribution, d(gA)
c2-statistic
(p-value) Uninformed Dictator
Informed:
B-chooses-top
Dictator 23.00
(< 0.0001)
Informed:
B-chooses-top row
14.08
(0.0029)
6.07
(0.2961)
Informed:
B-chooses-bottom row
7.63
(0.1412)
29.20
(< 0.0001)
21.52
(< 0.0001)
Empirical c2-test: p-values are averages from five 20,000 trial samplings of the contingency table distribution.
This method of calculation provides a more accurate p-value than a test that relies on a c2 table approximation.
We investigate the pattern of contributions across cells.  A t-test of the difference between means
checks for a location shift.  A chi-square test probes for any general differences.  The results are
unambiguous, and divide the cells into two distinct sets.  Specifically, there is no significant
difference between the dictator distribution and the B-chooses-top distribution.  Likewise, there is
no difference between the uninformed distribution and the B-chooses-bottom distribution.
Contributions are higher in the former two cells than in the latter two (for both tests p < 0.0003).
Technically, the two informed distributions are not independent.  A better approach to this
comparison is a matched pair test: If the two distributions are the same, then we expect the number
of subjects with a larger contribution in the cell where B-chooses-bottom to be offset by an equal
sized group that decrease their contribution.  In fact, 18 increase and 2 decrease (the rest stay the
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same).  This is strongly statistically significant (one-tail p < 0.0001).  So the matched pair test
yields a very similar result to that reported in Table 3.
In terms of the Table 2 notation, the comparative static results are
 A
Ig 2  = 
A
Dg  > 
A
Ug  = 
A
Ig 1            (4.1)
Equation (4.1) is consistent with the distributive preferences hypothesis.  The hypothesis
accurately predicts the shifts and non-shifts in the contribution distribution in all instances.
The sharp treatment effects leads us to reject all hypotheses that are strategy insensitive:
linear altruism, unconditional cooperation and random errors.  The strongest evidence against
linear altruism is the sharp difference between the two informed cells – the extent of A's
cooperation clearly depends on B's contribution.  Random errors also fail here, but perhaps the
strongest evidence against this hypothesis is the failure to predict that the strategically simpler
dictator game will garner a higher contribution level than the uninformed game.
Misidentification is also rejected as an explanation because contributions are much higher
in the dictator cell than in the uninformed cell, not the same.  The difference between informed
cells is also inconsistent with misidentification.
Direct reciprocity predicts that contributions should be the same for the B-chooses-bottom
cell and the dictator cell.  This is strongly rejected.  Further, the comparison of contributions in the
dictator cell and the B-chooses-top cell produces no evidence that the latter is higher, as direct
reciprocity predicts. Since this failure is equivalent to failure to reject a null hypothesis, it raises
the issue of statistical power.  Observe, however, that average contributions were actually
somewhat lower for B-chooses-top (Table 3), the opposite to the direction predicted by the
hypothesis.  More formally, we can get a sense of the power of the test by formulating direct
reciprocity as the null hypothesis, AIg 2 -
A
Dg  = c, and then asking, Given the data, what is the lowest
value of c for which we can reject?  The arithmetic produces c = 0.35.  So even if we conjecture
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that the average reciprocal reward for cooperation is just 0.35 of a contribution level (equivalent
to a reward of about 70 pesetas, or $0.54), we reject direct reciprocity.14
The normal good assumption made in conjunction with the Becker-model version of the
distributive preferences implies that contributors in B-chooses-bottom would contribute at least
two steps higher in either the dictator or B-chooses-top cell (inspect the Figure 1 payoffs).  Of
course some people may not contribute in any cell, and this could drive the average increase in
contribution below 2, even if the normal assumption accurately reflects the preferences of the
contributors.  In spite of this, Table 3 indicates that in comparing B-chooses-bottom with either the
dictator or the B-chooses-top cell, the average increase exceeds 2, unambiguously consistent with
the normal good assumption.  Testing the normal good assumption by comparing uninformed
contributions to dictator or B-chooses-top is potentially confounded by the uncertainty surrounding
B’s contribution in the uninformed cell.  Nevertheless, the differences between uninformed and
dictator is greater than 2, and the difference between uninformed and B-chooses-top is close to 2.
In sum, the data is in line with the normal good assumption.15
We might ask whether B players anticipated the higher A contributions when B-chooses-
top.  If so, we would expect that more players would be likely to contribute when in the role of B.
In fact, 41 percent (14/34) did so.  This is weakly significantly different than the 25 percent
observed in the uninformed cell (one tail p-value = 0.082).
We now turn to consider whether any additive combination of the reasons for contributing
advanced by the five hypotheses that fail individually, can explain the pattern of contributing
summarized by equation (4.1).  The following statement answers this question, and also
summarizes our findings:
                                                
14 Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) present additional evidence inconsistent with what we have called direct
reciprocity.
15 The aggregate evidence is also consistent with the notion of cooperative gain seeking put forward in Brandts
and Schram (1996). According to this concept some players are willing to cooperate as long as the payoffs they
obtain are higher than would be the case if everybody free rode. The average contribution in the B-chooses-top cell
is 3.2 and yields both players a payoff higher than the 750 they would obtain at the standard Nash equilibrium
outcome.
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Within the set of six hypotheses, distributive preferences is sufficient to explain equation
(4.1), and also necessary in that no additive combination of the remaining five hypotheses
is consistent with (4.1).
We have already demonstrated the sufficiency part.  For necessity, we have already explained that
the remaining five hypotheses are individually inconsistent with (4.1).  Now note that, excluding
distributive preferences, any additive combination of the remaining five hypotheses implies either
A
Ug  = 
A
Dg  or 
A
Ug  ³ 
A
Dg  (see Table 2), inconsistent with (4.1).
Finally, the reader might wonder whether the distributive preferences hypothesis’ success
with predicting the shifts and non-shifts in contributing across treatments could be plausibly
attributed to serendipity.  A simple calculation suggests this is unlikely: The experiment produces
four contributor distributions for which there are 6 pair-wise comparisons.   We found that the
distributions in two of these comparisons to be statistically the same, while the other four
comparisons were statistically different (see Table 3).  The chances of getting all six comparisons
correct by arbitrarily guessing ‘same’ and ‘different’ is ½6 = .016.  Even if we throw out the one
instance in which the distributive preferences hypothesis makes a prediction with weak inequality,
the chance of getting the experiment right by chance is only ½5 = .031.
5. Discussion and Summary
To summarize, we began with six hypotheses for contributions in dilemma games.  Each
can be classified in two ways; first, by whether the key concept is altruism, norms of cooperation
or mistakes; and second, by whether the hypothesis is strategy sensitive, in that contributions are
predicted to be dependent on information about others' contributions.  The domain for the test was
a simple two-person dilemma game with a standard public goods payoff function. We compared
the hypotheses on the basis of their ability to track the strategic behavior of contributors;
specifically, on the basis of how well a hypothesis tracks changes in the level of contribution in
response to changes in information about other player contributions.
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The data led us to two important findings.  First, the results are conclusive evidence that a
great deal of contributor behavior is strategically interdependent.  Strategy insensitive hypotheses
do not account for the strong shifts in contributions observed when we manipulated information
about the other player's contribution.  Second, of the strategy sensitive hypotheses, only
distributive preferences accurately tracks the pattern of contributions we observe.  No additive
combination of the other five hypotheses is capable of explaining the pattern.
There are, of course, features of the data within, as well as between, treatments.  To a
certain extent, the models behind the hypotheses make predictions about these features as well.
For example, we described two models to motivate the distributive preferences hypothesis.  We
noted that the ERC model predicts no one will contribute in the B-chooses-bottom cell of the
informed treatment, but in fact 27% (9 of 33) do choose to contribute.   Becker’s model is less
specific on this score, and so there is no inconsistency with this model.
Andreoni (1995), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) and Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) all
present analyses of (more than 2-person) experimental public goods games in which mistakes are
combined with some kind of purposeful behavior. Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) combine
linear altruism with mistakes, whereas Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) explain their data combining
heterogenous warm glow altruism and mistakes.16  These models cannot accommodate the shifts in
contributing that we observe across treatments.  Andreoni’s (1995) ‘kindness’ interpretation of his
experiment is compatible with the pattern of shifts we observe, although Andreoni’s interpretation
is not specific about the nature of the ‘kindness’ involved.
This might be a good place to reiterate a point we made in the introduction: Our experiment
does not rule out some contributors behaving in accord with any particular explanation.  So it may
well be that the larger than minimum contributions in the B-chooses-bottom cell are due to linear
altruism or mistakes (to name two).  The important point is that these particular explanations are
inadequate to explain the strategic behavior on display in our experiment.  A sizable number of
                                                
16 In the context of our experiment, the utility function Palfrey and Prisbrey’s identify evidence for is of the form
u(xA, g) = xA  +  ag where g is the level of gift (1 through 6 in our experiment), and a is a parameter.  These
preferences imply that the contributor will be strategy insensitive.
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individuals apparently have reasons for contributing that these hypotheses do not account for.  Any
model that neglects these reasons runs the risk of missing the strong strategic interdependence
exhibited among contributions.
As we also pointed out in the introduction, it may be that the strategic nature of contributing
is different when we move to a dilemma game with more than two players.  That this nature is
sharply discontinuous immediately above two, however, strikes us as implausible.  We would
pose our skepticism in terms of the hypothesis that best fit the strategic behavior we observed
here: ‘Why would a player care about the distribution of payoffs when there is one other player,
but not when there are two or three others?’  It strikes us as more plausible that, if the nature of
strategic behavior changes with more players, it changes gradually.  The important implication
being that strategic behavior in the two-player game is related to that in the three or four (or more)
player games.17
One final implication: At the outset, we noted that there was another sense in which one
might ask for an explanation for contributions.  Specifically, one might ask whether contributions
are, perhaps in some disguised way, consistent with strictly self-interested behavior.  While we
did not deal specifically with this first-principles question, one of our major findings provides
theorists who wish to dig deeper with a clue as to what a good first principle theory will have to
look like.  The particular pattern of contributing that we observe indicates a fair amount of
generosity, but also indicates that contributors are highly averse to being strategically exploited.
In this sense, the contributor behavior we observe has a strong self-interested component.
                                                
17 An apparent question that the conjectured continuity raises is what a player would condition their own
contribution on when there is more than one other player’s contribution to account for.  One possibility that
strikes us is some summary statistic of other’s contributions, such as the average.
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Appendix A: Laboratory Protocol
This section contains a description of all procedures, as well as verbal and written instructions
given to subjects for the uninformed treatment.  The monitor read all verbal instructions directly
from the protocol.  The only monitor-subject communication not included in the protocol are
answers to individual subject questions.  The dictator treatment differed solely in the numbers in
the bottom row of the Earnings Table.  The informed treatment differed only as indicated on
written instructions and task forms.  The protocol has been translated from the original Spanish.
Seating.  Upon entering the room each participant is randomly directed to a seat.  Half the seats have red
folders and half have blue.  Red folder seats on the right side of the room, and blue folder seats on the left
side.  May I have your attention please.  We are ready to begin.  Thank you for coming.  With the exception of the
folder, please remove all materials from your desk.  Open your folder and take out the sheet marked 'Instructions'.
At this time please read the instructions.  Participants read silently.  Written instructions begin here:
Instructions
General.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation.  Feel free to
ask a monitor questions as they arise.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any
nature with other participants is prohibited.
During the session you will make money.  Upon completion of the session the amount you make will be
paid to you in cash.  Payments are confidential: no other participant will be told the amount of money you make.
Half the participants were given blue folders and half red folders.  During the session, you will be paired
with a person having a different color folder than yours.  No one, however, will know the identity of the person
they are paired with.  Nor will these identities be revealed after the session is complete.
Decision Task.  In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B.  The amount
of money you earn depends on the decision you make and the decision of the person you are paired with.  The
Earnings Table below describes the options available to each person and the associated earnings.  You make your
decision by choosing one of the options available to you and recording it on a paper form.  The person in role A
can choose from options A1 through A6.  The person in role B can choose option B1 or B2.  Each person makes
their decision without knowing the decision of the other.  [In the informed treatment only:  B decides
unconditionally; that is, he simply chooses between B1 and B2.  A chooses conditionally; that is, A indicates a
decision for the case where B has chosen B1 and a decision for the case where B has chosen B2.  The decision of
A that counts is the one that corresponds to the decision of B.  Each person receives the earnings in the Earnings
Table cell corresponding to the chosen options.
(Same earnings table as in Figure 1 appeared here.)
Conduct of the Session.  You will participate in two decision tasks, called Task 1 and Task 2.  Both tasks are
identical to the description in the previous paragraph.  For each task, you will be paired with a different person.
You will have the role of A in one task, and the role of B in the other.  In task 1, those with red folders will have the
role of A, and those with blue folders will have the role of B.  In task 2, blue folders are A, and red folders are B.
First, you will receive a decision form for the role you have in task 1.  You will complete task 1, and all the forms
will be collected.  You will then receive a decision form for task 2 and complete task 2.  The results for task 1 will
not be revealed prior to completion of task 2.
Payment.  You will actually be paid your earnings for just one of the two tasks.  The one for payment will be
chosen by a coin flip after both tasks have been completed.  In order to preserve anonymity, the participants who
are B for the chosen task will be taken to a second room and paid separately.  Once you are paid, you may leave.
Written instructions end here.
I will now read the instructions out loud.  Read instructions.  Are there any questions?
Performing the decision  task.  Pass out decision forms for task 1.  We are ready to begin decision task 1.  You
make your decision by filling out the form that is now being handed out.  Those with red folders will receive the
form for role A, and those with blue folders will receive the form for role B.  Please review the form with me.
Written decision form for A begins here (form for B was analogous).
Distribution Task 1
You have the role of A.
The person you have been paired with has the role of B.  You must make your decision by choosing one of the
options available to you and described in the earnings table below.
(Same earnings table as in Figure 1 appeared here.)
Use the information in the earnings table to make your decision by circling the number of your chosen option.
A’s Decision:  Option    A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6
[In the informed treatment substitute:  A’s Decision if B chooses B1:  Option    A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6
      A’s Decision if B chooses B2:  Option    A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6 ]
When finished, please turn this sheet over and wait quietly.  Written decision form ends here.
Are there any questions?...Please fill out the form.  Again, when you are finished, turn the form over and wait
quietly. Wait until all are finished.  A monitor will now come around to collect the forms.  Collect the forms.
We are now ready to begin decision task 2.  Remember, you will be paired with a different person than you were in
task 1.  Hand out forms for task 2.  Are there any questions?...Please fill out the form.  Again, when you are
finished, turn the form over and wait quietly. Wait until all are finished.  A monitor will now come around to
collect the forms.  Collect the forms  A coin is flipped to determine roles.  Those in role B are taken to a
different room and paid separately after those in role A.
Appendix B:  The Data
The following three tables present all the data for the experiment.  Each row of each table displays
responses for one subject, for both A and B roles.  A-yes refers to A's response when B chooses the
top row; A-no the response when B chooses the bottom row.†
Uninformed Dictator Informed
A B A B A-yes A-no B
1 1 4 1 6 1 1
1 1 1 2 1 1 1
1 1 6 1 1 1 1
6 2 5 1 6 2 2
1 1 6 2 1 1 1
1 2 6 2 1 1 1
1 1 6 2 6 1 2
1 1 6 2 4 4 2
1 1 6 1 6 1 1
1 1 6 1 4 1 2
1 1 6 1 6 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 1
1 1 4 1 1 1 2
1 1 3 2 6 1 1
1 1 6 1 6 1 1
2 1 4 1 6 4 2
1 2 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 4 1 5 2 2
6 1 4 2 1 1 1
1 1 6 2 1 2 1
6 2 6 1 1 1 1
1 2 6 2 6 1 2
1 1 4 2 6 1 1
1 1 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 6 2 6 1 1
1 1 6 2 5 2 2
6 2 6 2 6 1 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 2 3 * 1
6 1 1 1 6 1 1
1 1 6 1 6 5 2
1 2 6 2 1 1 1
1 1 5 6 2
6 2 6 1 2
mean 1.9 1.3 4.4 1.6 3.8 1.6 1.4
std dev 1.9 0.4 2.0 0.5 2.3 1.3 0.5
*This value left blank by the subject.  Data for this subject was omitted from the analysis reported.
†An earlier version of this appendix listed B moves of 1 as 2, and 2 as 1.  A moves were correct as originally listed,
and all data analysis in the text was correct as originally presented.
